It is widely recognized that coupled socio-ecological dynamics can be qualitatively different from the dynamics of social or ecological systems in isolation from one another. The influence of the type of ecological dynamics on the dynamics of the larger socio-ecological system is less well studied, however. Here, we carry out such a comparison using a mathematical model of a common pool resource problem. A population must make decisions about harvesting a renewable resource. Individuals may either be cooperators, who harvest at a sustainable level, or defectors, who overharvest. Cooperators punish defectors through social ostracism. Individuals can switch strategies according to the costs and benefits of harvesting and the strength of social ostracism. These mechanisms are represented by a differential equation for social dynamics, which is coupled to three different types of resource dynamics: logistic growth, constant inflow, and threshold growth. We find that when human influence is sufficiently weak, the form of resource dynamics leaves a strong imprint on the socio-ecological dynamics, and human social dynamics are qualitatively very different from resource dynamics. However, stronger human influence introduces a broad intermediate parameter regime where dynamical patterns converge to a common type: the three types of ecological systems exhibit similar dynamics, but also, social and ecological dynamics mirror one another. This regime of strong human influence includes generation of stable limit cycles at high rates of social learning. Such oscillations are a consequence of stronger coupling and are reminiscent of synchrony in other fields, such as the classic problem of coupled oscillators. Socio-ecological convergence has implications for how we understand and manage complex socioecological systems. In an era of growing human influence on ecological systems, further empirical and theoretical work is required to determine whether socio-ecological convergence is present in real systems.
Introduction
Common pool resources (CPR) are natural or human-made resources available to everyone for consumption but where excluding individuals is difficult and where one person's use subtracts from another's use. This structure leads to a tendency for the resource to be overexploited (Ostrom 2007; 2009) . Some examples of CPR are certain fisheries, forests, groundwater basins, pastures, and irrigation systems. Until the 1980s, a commonly held assumption was that users of CPR will overexploit the resource in the absence of state control or full privatization (Cox et al. 2010) . However, Elinor Ostrom showed that a third approach was possible through self-organization. She formulated eight principles according to which government has only an indirect role, and where emergent phenomena including social norms and graduated sanctions help protect the resource (Ostrom 2015) . Subsequent research has refined and confirmed the insight that CPR users can develop self-governing institutions through communication among themselves and stop the commons from being overharvested, with little or no dependence on the state (Cox et al. 2010; Sarker et al. 2015) .
Forests are often used as a case study in CPR. On the global scale, forest cover has been in overall decline over the past few centuries as forests are cleared for their timber and to make way for agriculture. However, past decades have seen the reversal of this trend in some countries, in a "forest transition" to net re-forestation (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011; Pagnutti et al. 2013 ). This reversal has been driven both by improving crop yields, but also in some cases by socio-ecological interactions that slow down deforestation and stabilize forest cover (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2010) . In several developing countries, local ownership of forests came into effect after a government policy of decentralization. Some community-based forestry approaches include the Community Forestry, Nepal; Forest Councils, Kumaon; and the Joint Forest Management, India. These programs are intended to support sustainable resource management by maintaining the local population's right to participation in decision-making, in contrast to other approaches such as the Parks and Peoples' Program in Nepal that do not guarantee the local population's rights and participation (Agrawal and Gupta 2005; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001) . In Nepal, the concept of community forestry has been launched with the ambition of sustainable forest development, including poverty elimination through the reduction of various sources of social inequality. However, we note that whether community forestry reduces poverty remains an open question (Mahanty et al. 2006) .
Fisheries also exhibit features of CPRs. Many commercially important fish species are under threat due to overfishing. Also, in many commercial fishing methods that catch multiple species, bycatch of threatened species is a major source of depletion of many fish species. Historical examples from fisheries often illustrate the frequent failures of open-access regimes and the contrasting successes of community-based management (Uchida and Wilen 2004; Berkes 2005) .
Standard competition theory assumes individuals will compete to exploit a CPR and thus reduce a resource to its lowest possible level (Tilman 1994) . However, theoretical models of CPRs have extended classical work to include social norms, ostracism, and sanctions that favor cooperation (Lade et al. 2013; Iwasa and Lee 2013; Tavoni et al. 2012; Sigdel et al. 2017) . Individuals who cooperate with one another may choose to punish defectors in the group who attempt to overexploit the resource, thus ensuring the resource is sustainably harvested. From a socio-ecological perspective, CPR problems exemplify a coupled socio-ecological system (or human-environment system), where the dynamics of a social system influence an ecological system, and vice versa (Innes et al. 2013; Henderson et al. 2013) . Previous research has explored how the tension between social norms that tend to drive populations to conformity, and conservation priorities that become stronger as a resource becomes more rare, compete with one another to generate complex dynamics (Sigdel et al. 2017) . Other research explores how changing the time horizons and discounting rates that individuals use in conservation decisions can have differing impacts on resource level and stability in socio-ecological forest models (Henderson et al. 2016 ). This research compares how different policies can result in different socio-ecological dynamics, some of which conserve the resource better than others (Henderson et al. 2013) . The role of population heterogeneity in the efficiency of graduated sanctions has been explored in mathematical models (Iwasa and Lee 2013) , while agent-based models enable researchers to incorporate greater socio-economic and demographic complexity to explore human-wildlife interactions Marley et al. 2017) .
A socio-ecological regime shift occurs when a change in system parameters leads to a shift between alternative social and/or ecological states. When the shift occurs suddenly and leads to a qualitatively different, strongly contrasting state (such as through a discontinuity), it is a critical transition. In coupled socio-ecological systems, regime shifts may be present and are often analyzed through mathematical models. Human feedback has a crucial role in shaping socioecological regime shifts. Feedback of declining resource dynamics on human opinion, strategies, or behavior may not only prevent the system from collapsing through a critical transition, but also creates conditions under which resources can be maintained . Regime shifts in CPR can also be prevented under cooperative harvesting practices where resource overexploitation due to non-cooperative harvesters is controlled through social ostracism (Lade et al. 2013) . Such regime shifts are not exhibited in ecological subsystems in isolation from human dynamics (Lade et al. 2013; Sigdel et al. 2017) . Regime shifts can characterize both terrestrial systems, such as shrublands, and marine systems, such as coral reefs (Barange et al. 2008; Ratajczak et al. 2014; Thampi et al. 2018) .
Forests, fisheries, groundwater basins, and other socioecological CPRs exhibit diverse types of resource dynamics. Some systems may be open to restocking or recolonization from outside while others are relatively closed. Other systems may exhibit threshold behavior where the resource abundance must exceed a certain threshold in order to remain viable. As a result, the assumed form for resource dynamics in socio-ecological models varies. For instance, Lade et al. (2013) explore a model where resources flow into the system at a constant rate. They find that, surprisingly, increasing the resource inflow rate can cause a regime shift from a high level of cooperation to violation of social norms (defection) and collapse of the resource. This occurs because defectors accrue more benefits from a larger resource flow, hence the conditions favor cooperators who switch their strategy (Tavoni et al. 2012) . Subsequent research allows the resource inflow rate to vary over time, as well as assuming socially independent communities connected through the same ecological system (Schlüter et al. 2016) . In contrast, a threshold recruitment rate for trees based on the existing density of trees is considered in a socio-ecological forest-grassland model by Innes et al. (2013) . Threshold-based recruitment is found to create alternative stable ecological states, except when human influence and social learning are very strong in which case stable limit cycles can result (Innes et al. 2013 ). Other models assume that tree recruitment simply follows a logistic growth, but alternative stable ecological states can still occur in such systems for certain parameter regimes due to social norms (Sigdel et al. 2017) .
Although CPR problems have been relatively wellstudied in the mathematical modelling literature, we do not know of any model-based analyses that systematically compare socio-ecological dynamics under different types of resource dynamics. This is an important knowledge gap because it can be difficult to draw conclusions by comparing different published models. Published models typically differ in more than one aspect of their structure, parameterization, and analysis, making it difficult to determine which aspect is responsible for differences in predictions. Therefore, an approach where all aspects of socio-ecological modelling are kept the same and only the type of ecological dynamics is allowed to vary can serve as a valuable experimental control in silico. Accordingly, our objective is to study how the type of resource dynamics influences outcomes in a socio-ecological model. We develop three ordinary differential equation models of common pool resource dynamics, corresponding to three different types of resource dynamics. Individuals either cooperate to harvest sustainably (and punish those who do not through social ostracism) or they defect and overexploit the resource. We explore and compare model dynamics through stability analysis and numerical analysis. The model is described in the next section.
Model development

Model 1
Consider a resource limited by a carrying capacity, where F ∈ [0, 1] is the current level of the resource compared to its maximal carrying capacity, F = 1. Let R, μ, and n be the growth rate, natural death rate, and number of resource users per year, respectively. We consider a harvesting community in which individuals are divided into two groups of differing strategies: x is the proportion of cooperators and 1 − x is the proportion of defectors. We denote e c and e d as the harvesting effort for cooperators and defectors, respectively. We assume that e d > e c since defectors harvest more than cooperators. We assume logistic growth of the resource, as might occur through population reproduction. We assume that the resource is removed in one of two ways: natural death or harvesting. Thus, the differential equation for resource dynamics can be written as:
where n[e c x+e d (1−x)] represents total harvesting intensity (Lade et al. 2013) .
To model social dynamics, we use an approach similar to Sigdel et al. (2017) , where individuals learn successful strategies from one another. Each individual adopts one of two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). Let π(C) and π(D) be the payoff functions of cooperators and defectors, respectively. Each individual communicates with ("samples") others at rate κ and compares the payoff gain or loss that would be received by adopting the sampled person's strategy (if the sampled person is using a different strategy). If π(C) > π(D), then an individual adopting D switches to C with probability pU C , where U C = π(C) − π(D) > 0 is the net gain in payoff by switching to C and p is a proportionality constant that we require to be sufficiently small such that pU C < 1. Therefore, the proportion (1 − x) of defectors at any given time becomes cooperators at the
then the proportion x of cooperators becomes defectors at the rate xκ(1 − x)pU D . Combining these two terms gives:
where k = 2κp. The payoff function depends on the net benefits of harvesting, which is the payoff from resource production through harvesting minus the cost of harvesting per unit effort. In addition, defectors suffer reduced payoff due to social ostracism. We assume the impact of ostracism on the defector payoff depends on x and is given by h
x, where h is a proportionality constant controlling the overall magnitude of ostracism. The ratio
determines how the strength of ostracism depends on the relative difference in harvesting efforts between cooperators and defectors. Hence, the payoff functions for two groups can be written as:
where m and w are the average resource productivity and the cost of harvesting, respectively. The payoff functions were developed from Lade et al. (2013) . The difference in our model is in the production function: the classical CobbDouglas production function in Lade et al. has been replaced by a simpler linear function. Substituting these expressions into Eq. 2 gives us the following equation to represent strategy dynamics:
where β ≡
h . We will refer to these parameter combinations as the average resource productivity and cost of harvesting, respectively.
Let us non-dimensionalize the socio-ecological system specified by Eqs. 1a and 3b by expressing the independent variable t as t = t ct with t c = 1 n(e d −e c ) and wheret is non-dimensionalized time. Then,
n(e d −e c ) . Note that D > 1 since e d > e c . We observe that the non-dimensionalized resource dynamics depend on two rescaled parameters A and D that we will refer to as the growth rate and the removal rate, respectively. We will also refer to α as the social learning rate. Note that harvesting by cooperators decreases the resource level despite the positive term xF because a combined harvesting pressure from both cooperators and defectors is provided through the −DF term. These features will be shared by the next two models we develop. We note that Model 1 has an invariant rectangle [0, 1] × [0, 1] in R 2 and its initial value problem has a unique solution (Supplementary Material, Appendix A).
Model 2
Instead of assuming a logistic resource growth rate as in Model 1, Model 2 considers resource dynamics given by:
where λ controls the resource inflow rate. Nondimensionalizing the resource dynamics in (5b) in the same way as before and using the same model for social dynamics gives us the social-ecological system:
is referred to simply as the growth rate. For convenience, we will refer to this assumed form for resource dynamics as a "constant inflow rate." To justify this, we note that the BF term in the input flow could be absorbed into the removal term DF , leaving just the inflow rate dF /dt = B + · · · . However, this would also mean replacing DF by a term D F where D = D + B. Instead, we opted to use the form in Eq. 6 so that the same rescaled parameter D appears in all three models, to facilitate their comparison. Finally, we note that Model 2 has an invariant rectangle [0, 1] × [0, 1] in R 2 and its initial value problem has a unique solution (Supplementary Material, Appendix A).
Model 3
For this model, the natural resource dynamics are logistic but the recruitment constant R is replaced by a density-dependent recruitment rate R(F ) to represent systems where growth is only possible when the resource level exceeds a fixed threshold (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S1 ). In this case, the resource dynamics are given by:
gives the resource recruitment rate in which a controls the sharpness of the transition and b controls the location of the transition. Nondimensionalizing the resource dynamics in Eq. 7b as before yields the social-ecological system 
Baseline parameter values and numerical analysis
The variables and parameter values for all three models appear in Table 1 . We distinguish two possible scenarios for the baseline parameter values. Under the weak human influence scenario, the growth and removal rates are relatively large such that social dynamics have a relatively small impact on the natural dynamics (see "Results"). In contrast, under the strong human influence scenario, the growth and removal rates are reduced, which will allow social dynamics to strongly impact the natural dynamics.
Baseline parameter values for the scenario of weak human influence were derived by calibrating the models to a calibration target where both F and x converge to 0.5 over a timescale of several decades (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S2 ). Our rationale was not to replicate any observed socio-ecological dynamics of particular realworld systems, but rather to create a common starting point that would make it easier to compare the dynamics of the three models under parameter variation. (However, a decadal timescale has been used to model previous social shifts in socio-ecological systems based on empirical data from forest transitions indicating such a timescale ). To generate baseline parameter values for strong human influence, we worked from the weak human influence scenario. Working from the original dimensionbearing parameterization, for Models 1 and 3, we reduced the growth rates R and L from 0.022/year to 0.01/year, and we reduced the natural death rate μ from 0.008/year to 0.001/year. For Model 2, we reduced the resource inflow rate λ from 0.005/year to 0.0025/year and the natural death rate of resource μ from 0.002/year to 0.00025/year. These changes are reflected in the re-parameterized values of A, B, C, and D.
XPPAUT was used to generate bifurcation diagrams at a tolerance level of 10 −7 (Ermentrout 2002 ). Matlab's ode45 function was used for time series and phase planes. Parameter planes for Models 1 and 2 were generated from equilibrium calculations and local stability analysis (Supplementary Material, Appendix A). Parameter planes for Model 3 were generated by using ode45 to find numerical solutions at grid points in the D-γ plane and using Matlab's patch (area plot for polygon) to plot the approximate regions.
Ecological system in isolation from social system
To obtain the isolated systems from the coupled systems, we decouple the social and ecological subsystems by considering only the differential equations for the resource dynamics and replacing the state variable x by a constant value. We choose x = 1 without loss of generality. (For any x = k where k is a constant, we simply need a transformation from D − 1 to D − k to get the same result.)
In the absence of social dynamics and with x = 1, the resource dynamics from Eqs. 4, 6, and 8 become:
with F (0) = F 0 ∈ R ≥0 . Note that D > 1. We also note that the rescaled parameters A, B, C, and D were previously specified to contain original parameters from the social dynamics such as n, e d , and e c . In this case, the parameters simply correspond to natural recruitment rates, and to a transformed natural death rate D − 1. However, we retain the previous notation to facilitate comparison between the coupled and uncoupled systems.
Results
In this section, we first characterize the dynamics of the three ecological subsystems in isolation from the social subsystem, before showing how these dynamics change under the addition of weak or strong human influence.
Ecological system in isolation from social system The models yield different outputs as a function of growth rates A, B, and C (Fig. 1a, b, c) . In Model 1, there is a regime shift from the resource-free state to a stable nontrivial resource level as A increases. In Model 2, only the non-trivial resource state is stable, for all values of B. In Model 3, when C is small, only the resource-free state exists. As C increases, however, a fold bifurcation introduces a critical transition beyond which both the resource-free and the non-trivial resource equilibria are stable. The system converges to one state or the other depending on initial conditions.
As the removal rate D is increased, populations are reduced or collapse completely in all three models (Fig. 2a , Table 1. b, c). In Model 1, this occurs through a transcritical bifurcation at zero resource level, and in Model 3, it occurs through a fold bifurcation, corresponding to a sudden regime shift from non-zero resources level to resource extinction. In Model 2, however, resource levels decline with increasing values of D but resources are never extinguished as in the other two models.
Coupled socio-ecological system
In this section, we discuss the results from the coupled systems and compare them to the isolated systems. We begin with analyzing the scenario of weak human influence, and then look at the scenario of strong human influence.
The equilibria (F * , x * ) for Model 1 are: x I ) in which the number of interior equilibria B 3 could vary from 0 to 2. Also, for Model 3, the equilibria (F * , x * ) are: (F 2 , 1) , and C 5 = (F I , x I ) in which the number of boundary equilibria C 2 , C 4 , and the interior state C 5 could vary from 0 to 2. The details of the local stability analysis for each model can be found in Supplementary Material, Appendix A.
For convenience, we use the same symbols to denote interior equilibria when their exact expression is not required or when a solution is only known implicitly. In particular, we sometimes use 0 < F 1 < 1 to denote a steady-state resource level when x = 0; we use 0 < F 2 < 1 to denote a steady-state resource level when x = 1; and we use (F I , x I ) to denote an interior equilibrium.
Numerical simulations: weak human influence
We used bifurcation diagrams to explore the equilibria of the three models for the weak human influence scenario. When the resource productivity β is sufficiently small, the coupled system behaves in a similar way to the isolated system as the growth rates A, B, and C increase (i.e., similar to Fig. 1a, b, c) . In this case, x = 1 is stable across the entire parameter range. However, for a larger value of β, feedback from the social system splits the stable interior branch into two new branches with stable and unstable portions (Fig. 1d,  e, f) . When the growth rate parameters are small, x = 1 is stable and thus the higher branch of the two new branches is stable, corresponding to more sustainable resource use. However, sufficiently high values of A, B, and C in all three models force a switch in stability so that x = 0 becomes stable, along with the lower resource level branch. In all three models, the shift to the lower resource level branch is through a (small) critical transition. However, a further increase in the value of β causes the transition to become non-critical (i.e., continuous) in all three models (Fig. 1g,  h, i) . Regardless of whether the transition is critical or noncritical, the transition from the upper branch to the lower branch corresponds to a parameter regime where an increase in the growth rate causes an increase in overexploitation and thus a (surprising) decline in the resource level. The behavior of x in this parameter regime is relatively simple: when the lower resource level branch is stable, defectors dominate the population (x = 0); when the upper resource level branch is stable, cooperators dominate (x = 1); and in the transition regime between lower and upper branches, the population is heterogeneous (0 < x < 1) (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S3 ).
The dependence of the three models on the removal rate D across different values of the resource productivity parameter β (Fig. 2) shows patterns similar to those observed in Fig. 1 . As β increases, social feedback causes the interior stable branch to split into two, with the lower branch being stable for small values of D and the upper branch being stable for larger values of D. This means that a sufficiently large removal rate can simulate an increase in the prevalence of cooperator strategists. In turn, across a limited range of values for D, this feedback causes the resource level to increase as the removal rate D increases, instead of the decreasing dependence on D that is always observed in the isolated ecological system. The behavior of x reflects the same three behaviors as for Fig. 1 : all-cooperate, all-defect, or an intermediate regime (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S4 ).
Taken together, Figs. 1 and 2 highlight the importance of the type of resource dynamics in determining outcomes in socio-ecological systems under weak human influence. Strategies change in a similar way as A, B, C, and D are varied in the three models, with a tendency toward greater cooperation when the resource is threatened. However, the outcome of changing growth rates or removal rates may vary from robust resource persistence despite parameter change (Model 2) to a continuous or discontinuous transition to resource extinction (Models 1 and 3, respectively). Moreover, in the isolated system, only Model 3 exhibits a critical transition, while in the coupled socio-ecological system, Model 1 can also exhibit a critical transition.
The D-γ parameter plane confirms these trends for the scenario of weak human influence (Fig. 3) : stability switches from a state of defectors to a state of cooperators as the resource removal rate increases in all three models. In Model 1, the regime shift takes place gradually through a state of intermediate levels of cooperation, whereas in Models 2 and 3, the intermediate state may or may not be present, leading to a critical transition. In the lower half of the plane (smaller harvesting cost), defection tends to dominate, while in the upper half (larger harvesting cost), cooperation is more dominant. Resource collapse is Fig. 3 The parameter planes for removal rate D versus harvesting cost γ indicate how an increase in the removal rate generally supports the cooperator strategy, in a Model 1, b Model 2, and c Model 3. The labels in the subpanels designate equilibria that are stable in the corresponding regions (see Results: coupled socio-ecological system for definitions of the abbreviations used for the equilibria). All other parameter values come from the weak human influence scenario in Table 1 . Fig. 4 Phase portraits reveal two timescales for convergence to interior equilibria in a Model 1, b Model 2, and c Model 3. The interior equilibrium is stable in Models 1 and 2, whereas an interior equilibrium shares the stability with a boundary equilibrium of all-cooperators and zero-resource level in Model 3. Parameter values come from the weak human influence scenario of Table 1 . The boundary lines x = 0, x = 1, and F = 0 are invariant not possible in Model 2 due to the constant inflow of resources. However, a larger resource removal rate always pushes resources to the brink of collapse in Models 1 and 3, despite the whole population practicing cooperation at higher values of the removal rate. The interior equilibrium in Model 1 is stable across a much broader parameter regime of harvesting cost than that in Models 2 and 3. We also note that the zero-resource, all-cooperate equilibrium in Model 3 is always stable.
Phase portraits for the weak human influence scenario illustrate the two timescales that characterize the system (Fig. 4) . Resource dynamics converge rapidly to a manifold of the interior equilibrium, and both social and resource dynamics thereafter converge more slowly along this manifold to the interior equilibrium. In Model 3, for some initial conditions, the socio-ecological dynamics converge to the (0, 1) boundary equilibrium instead.
The baseline scenario corresponds to a situation where human influence is still relatively weak, since the splitting of the interior stable branch as resource productivity β increases is relatively small. In many real systems, the presence of humans can determine resource dynamics more strongly. Hence, in the next subsection, we explore the scenario of strong human influence.
Numerical simulations: strong human influence
Next, we explore the case of strong human influence in which the parameter values governing human impacts are increased relative to the parameter values governing natural effects (Table 1) . In this case, the trends observed in Figs The D-γ parameter plane for strong human influence confirms these findings and is qualitatively similar to the parameter plane for the weak human influence case (Fig. 5) . As before, the prevalence of the cooperator strategy increases with an increasing resource removal rate. However, the interior equilibrium is stable across a broader parameter regime in the scenario of strong human influence. Moreover, in Model 1, we notice a region of instability for all equilibria in which a stable limit cycle is exhibited instead, corresponding to oscillations in x and F (see Fig. 6 for phase portrait).
Starting from the scenario of strong human influence (Table 1) coupled socio-ecological system for definitions of the abbreviations used for the equilibria). The white region is the region of instability for all equilibria. All other parameter values come from the strong human influence scenario in Table 1 Furthermore, making social ostracism sufficiently strong can cause socio-ecological dynamics to converge to the patterns observed in the isolated systems for Models 1 and 3 but not for Model 2. If we double the strength of social ostracism (α = 1.6, β = 3.5, γ = 1.5), then the qualitative patterns of the model are unchanged (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S8a, b, c) . However, if the strength of social ostracism is tripled, strong social norms force a stable upper branch in the resource level for a broader range of parameter values (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S8d, e, f) . The x = 0 branch becomes unstable across the entire parameter regime in this situation, meaning there are no defectors and the population converges to an all-cooperator equilibrium. This restores the model output so that it once again resembles the output of the isolated system in Models Fig. 6 Phase portrait showing trajectories (red) leading to a stable limit cycle (blue) in the strong human influence scenario with D = 2.6 and γ = 0.1. These dynamics correspond to the white region in the D-γ parameter plane of Model 1 in Fig. 5a . All other parameter values come from the strong human influence baseline values in Table 1 1 and 3. However, a critical transition emerges for Model 2 (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S8e ).
Increasing the social learning rate can have striking effects on the system, leading to convergence of dynamics between the three systems across a broad parameter regime (Fig. 7) . It also tends to destabilize the system, leading to oscillations in the prevalence of cooperators and in the resource level. For these diagrams, we increased the social learning rate from α = 0.8 to α = 5 (Models 1 and 3) and α = 8 (Model 2). This destabilizes the interior equilibria through Hopf bifurcations, causing the emergence of stable limit cycles for all three models (Fig. 7a, b, c) . This is also observed in the corresponding bifurcation diagrams for x versus A, B, and C (Fig. 7d, e, f) . In this parameter regime, human and natural dynamics mirror one another through their shared characteristic of stable limit cycles. This contrasts with very distinct dynamics in the human and natural subsystems observed in other parameter regimes (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Figs. S5 and S7) . The oscillations in the human system are also more extreme than the oscillations in the natural system, on account of the slower dynamics in the natural system. Time series show damped oscillations in the resource level and prevalence of cooperation, and these oscillations persist for a longer period of time in Model 2 than those in the other models (Supplementary Material, Appendix B, Fig. S9 ).
Discussion
Our objective was to understand how different types of natural resource dynamics influence the dynamics of the larger socio-ecological system of which they are a part. We found that the form of natural resource dynamics leaves its imprint in the coupled socio-ecological system when switches from stable to unstable overlaps with the range of stability for (0, 1). α = 5 for Model 1 and 3 and α = 8 for Model 2. All other parameter values come from the weak human influence scenario in Table 1 human influence is weak. In this regime, social dynamics are dissimilar to resource dynamics, and resource dynamics in the socio-ecological system reflect many of the features of resource dynamics in isolation from human dynamics. We observed how the addition of weak human influence splits the interior stable branches into two separate branches, one corresponding to x = 0 and one corresponding to x = 1, with a small intermediate regime where 0 < x < 1. However, the new branches followed the same general trend as in the isolated system, and bifurcation types such as fold bifurcations carried over.
The imprint of the natural systems was increasingly obscured as human influence was strengthened, however. Stronger human influence expanded the size of the parameter regime where the human population has a heterogeneous strategy structure (0 < x < 1). In this parameter regime, the resource dynamics under the three types of natural dynamics diverged from their form in the isolated ecological system, and they began converging to a similar pattern in all three models. In particular, we observed how growing human influence modulated the resource level across the intermediate parameter regime. As a result, changes in the growth rate or the death rate caused a counteractive response by the human population. This caused the resource level to have an opposite dependence on the growth or removal rates than was expected: for instance, the resource level could increase with an increase in the removal rate. However, when social learning is fast enough, all three models exhibit stable limit cycles in both social and resource dynamics. Thus, social and ecological dynamics mirror one another when human influence is sufficiently strong. Such a synchrony between social and ecological dynamics is not unexpected and it echoes the couplinginduced synchrony observed in many physical systems such as coupled oscillators. Outside of this intermediate range, we recovered x = 0 or x = 1, leaving no room for an adaptive human response as parameter values are modified.
The application of our approach to real-world socioecological systems depends on how certain an investigator is regarding the type of natural resource dynamics exhibited by the system. If the type of natural resource dynamics is known and data are available, then a simple parameter inference exercise would enable placing the socio-ecological system in parameter space (e.g., Figs. 3 and 5) and thus determining proximity to any bifurcation points. However, if the type of natural dynamics is not clear, or if there is a mixture of types, then a structural sensitivity analysis combining the stability conditions from local stability analysis (Supplementary Material, Appendix A) under multiple types of resource dynamics could result in useful "rules of thumb" that would constitute conservative bounds on how close the system is to a bifucation point such as a critical transition.
In CPR problems, support for conservationism depends not only upon the abundance of the resource but also upon the resource growth rate. Our model showed how a low resource growth rate is associated with cooperation whereas a high growth rate is associated with defection. Similarly, a low resource removal rate is associated with defection and a high removal rate with cooperation. This response of population strategy composition to changes in resource flow parameters has also been observed in other theoretical models of harvesting in socio-ecological systems, and is driven by the fact that defectors can get more benefit than cooperators as the resource growth rate increases (Lade et al. 2013) .
Our finding that certain conditions allow socioecological dynamics to converge to a common pattern where social and ecological dynamics strongly mirror one another-irrespective of the type of natural dynamicshas implications for our understanding of socio-ecological dynamics, including how they respond to policy interventions and other external shocks, as well as how we should model them. Further research is required to explore the robustness of the finding to relaxations of our simplifying assumptions, and to explore parameter space more systematically. An empirical test of this hypothesis would have to deal with complicated challenges stemming from very different timescales associated with social and ecological systems, and perhaps more importantly, the long-term nature of these dynamics and the presence of other processes that impact the socio-ecological system. In the same vein, future work could also expand our base model by considering the impacts of external policy interventions, adding stochasticity to capture resource extinction events, or exploring the impact of sources of social and ecological heterogeneity such as additional spatial or social structure.
